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ABSTRACT**: Corporate contributions to charity, like 
advertising expenditures, may have a long-term effect on a firm's 
image and profits. Recent examples of corporate giving show that 
many gifts are made in the 'enlightened self-interest' of the donor. 
One way to view corporate giving is as a managerial tool that 
affects the firnis profits. This paper examines charitable spending, 
where firms treat 'goodwill' expenditures in both the product and 
factor markets as strategic variables. Contributions may be 
enhanced or impaired by contributions made by other firms. The 
model allows firms to make decisions about corporate giving that 
are cooperative or noncooperative, where efficiency is gained 
through cooperation. Market conditions determine whether 
cooperation is sustainable. As the time horizon lengthens, the 
discount factor of future earnings rises, or the level of industry 
cooperation rises, and firms are more likely to cooperate in 
charitable giving. 
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1 Introduction 
Strictly speaking, the term 'corporate contributions' refers to 
corporate gifts of cash or property to charities; these contributions 
annually amounted to nearly $6 billion in the early 1990s (Foundation 
Directory 19931). In practice many expenditures, including corporate 
contributions and some business and advertising expenditures, are 
part of a broader class of expenditures aimed at selling and promoting 
company goods and services.2 Charitable expenditures may serve to 
raise public awareness about the 'social consciousness' of a corporation 
and are nearly always in the firm's 'enlightened self-interest';3 that is, 
they have a long-term effect on a firm's 'goodwill' or image.4 
The Corporate Philanthropy Report (1990, Vol. 1, No. 6, pp. 7,16) and 
Craig Smith (editor, in letter dated 5 September 1990) offer several 
examples that indicate the nature of corporate contributions in the 1980s: 
(i) IBM has begun touting its social responsibility policies in an 
advertising campaign. In one advertisement, people at IPM 
discuss the company's 'values that last . . . respect for one 
another, for our customers, and for every individual touched by 
what we do'. Some focus on small businesses, the environment, 
and community relations. 
(ii) Nissan's Infiniti Division and Toyota's Lexus Division are both 
using cultural sponsorships to position themselves with affluent 
1 US Code of Federal Regulations (26 CFR), 1988. Internal Revenue Code, 
classification 501(c)(3~ For more on the tax laws regarding corporate giving, 
see Webb (1994). 
2 We use the term 'corporate goodwill' to refer to all donations made to 
charitable organizations and other worthy causes that also enhance the 
reputation of the corporate donor. It does not refer to the asset classification 
used by a firm's accounting system. In practice, these donations are very 
difficult to measure as they may be called charitable donations, advertising 
expenditures, or other forms of business expenditures according to the 
accounting records of the corporation. Note that all forms of business 
expenditures and contributions are treated the same according to the tax 
code. For more on this, see Smith (no date~ 
3 Enlightened self-interest may be said to encompass any activity that 
benefits the firm in the long run, whether the activity maximizes profits, or 
some other objective function. One of the first discussions of this concept is 
found in Baumol (1970). For another source, see Galaskiewicz (1985~ For more 
foundation giving in general, see Odendahl (1987). 
4 This is not to say that the intent of corporate executives in sponsoring 
worthy causes is strictly to promote the firm's interests. 
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Americans. Lexus sponsored Phantom of the Opera in Los Angeles, 
Goodwill Games in Seattle, Miami City Ballet, San Francisco 
Opera, and the Philadelphia Orchestra. Infiniti favours the 
Chicago Symphony, Kansas City's Starlight Theatre, jazz and 
blues artists in Chicago, and the Dallas Arboretum's new 
international garden. 
(iii) Japanese companies are increasingly supporting US charities. The 
Center for Better Corporate Citizenship (CBCC), which received 
its tax-exempt status in June 1990, allows Japanese companies 
that do not have their own foundations to fund US nonprofit 
organizations by using the CBCC to arrange tax-exempt status for 
gifts. CBCC was created 'to heighten the awareness of the Japanese 
investing firms to the concerns of the local communities and 
nations, and to encourage and support Japanese integration into 
the local societies'. 
These examples demonstrate that firm image and charity are tied 
together in such a way that corporations benefit not only by being 
socially responsible, but also receive benefits from increased sales, 
more satisfied employees, and positive reactions from the community. 
The concepts of corporate giving and corporate goodwill have been 
linked for many years. In 1935, Franklin Roosevelt surmised that 
corporations use corporate gifts to 'purchase' goodwill (Corporation 
Gifts to Charities, 1935, p.540). However, corporate goodwill has been 
largely ignored by economists. Only Maddox McElroy and Siegfried 
(1981) model the effects of corporate expenditures on a profit-
maximizing firm's demand and costs. They state that price is based on 
contributions inducing good-will, an intangible intermediate product 
that influences demand' (p. 212). Maddox McElroy and Siegfried also 
note that some firms' costs may be lowered by contributions, but they 
never specifically mention goodwill when describing costs. Other 
studies model corporate giving by assuming one of four motivations: 
profit maximization, utility maximization of managers or owners, 
altruism, and social responsibility or duty. For more on these 
motivations and empirical studies testing these hypotheses, see, for 
example, Navarro (1988a, 1988b), Clotfelter (1985), and Maddox and 
Siegfried (1981) and Maddox McElroy and Siegfried (1981, 1982). 
The advertising literature examines firms' image or goodwill and 
the effect of advertising expenditures on other firms (Friedman 1983). 
This paper combines ideas from the economics literature on corporate 
giving with the advertising concepts addressing the actions a firm takes 
to affect its image or the image of another firm. We present a new model 
of corporate giving where firm image and the effect of each firm's 
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contributions on the other are considered. The model is similar to 
Friedman's advertising model, in that firms treat goodwill 
expenditures made to enhance sales as a strategic variable. In 
addition, firms recognize that their expenditures may help other firms 
or harm them. The model differs in that firms recognize that corporate 
contributions may affect the reputation of the firm in the factor 
market.5 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of cooperation 
in charitable spending in the context of a theoretical model, where 
firms either explicitly or implicitly agree to a joint profit-maximizing 
level of contributions but remain competitors in the product market.6 
This analysis is conducted in terms of a static model of oligopolistic 
competition. In the base case, firms compete in levels of corporate 
charitable spending and output. The conditions for cooperation in 
charitable spending are analysed, and incentives to deviate are 
explored. The equilibrium and comparative static results provide 
insight into the nature of corporate charitable activities. Although 
data sources needed to test our hypotheses are scarce, we hope that 
we can provide insight into charitable giving that will be useful to test 
corporate behaviour in the future. As Weisbrod notes, 'until we decide 
what kinds of questions we seek to answer we cannot define the 
nonprofit sector in a useful manner, and we cannot specify what data 
about it would be of interest' (1977, p.11). 
2 The effect of corporate contributions 
Corporate contributions may affect the firm's image, which in turn 
affects corporate profits. Contributions may improve the image of the 
firm in the eyes of potential and current customers, as well as 
5 We assume that firms are concerned with social responsibility. Books such 
as Green at Work (Cohn, 1992), The Human Side of Corporate Competitiveness and 
The Role of Business in Society (Diebold 1982) suggest employees, stockholders 
and other parties interested in supplying labour and capital to a business are 
concerned with firms' 'social responsibility'. 
6 It is probably unusual for firms to make explicit contracts with one another 
to provide charitable gifts or services to a particular charity. However, in some 
industries and in some regions of the USA, firms participate in 'giving clubs' or 
'tithing clubs; where they agree to donate a given percentage of income to 
charity. This practice suggests that firms must make donations in order to be 
viewed as socially responsible. 
©CIRIEC 1996 
EFFECT OF CORPORATE CHARITABLE EXPENDITURES 33 
employees of the firm, and make them more likely to buy the firm's 
products or want to work for the company. Similarly, contributions 
may increase the likelihood that creditors and other interested parties 
make decisions that are in the interest of the corporation's business 
operations. Contributions, then, can raise demand for the firm's goods 
and services, and lower costs, and are modelled as inputs to both the 
inverse demand and cost functions.7 
Corporate contributions have effects on other firms both inside 
and outside the industry. These inter-firm effects may be characterized 
as 'cooperative' or 'predatory'. As Tirole notes (1988, p.372), predation is 
an intuitive notion referring to using low prices or high advertising 
levels to induce a rival's exit, even though this may simply be a 
competitive ('innocent') behaviour intended to maximize profits. It is 
quite likely that corporate contributions are made in the firm's self-
interest and, in many cases, in a competitive manner. Like advertising, 
these gifts may have detrimental effects on other firms; however, it is 
difficult to imagine that a corporate executive could strategically use 
corporate giving with the intent to run another firm out of business. 
We will refer to contributions that help an industry or group of firms 
as 'helpful' or 'cooperative', and those that are 'predatory' as 'harmful', 
meaning harmful to other firms. 
In the output market, harmful contributions are characterized by 
an expenditure that benefits the firm making the donation by shifting 
sales to it, away from its rivals, without causing new firms to enter the 
market. An example is Apple Computer's donations of millions of its 
computers to the elementary education system. These donations 
converted millions of school-age children, as well as their parents and 
teachers, into loyal consumers of Apple products. On the other hand, 
contributions made by a dairy, and supported by the logo of the 
American Dairy Council, benefit both the dairy and all dairy 
producers. This type of contribution may be thought of as cooperative, 
7 It is unlikely that corporate contributions immediately result in 
awareness of the good deeds of the company. More likely, these expenditures 
create a kind of intangible capital, which might be called goodwill. Over time, 
the stock of goodwill would diminish to zero if no further expenditures were 
made to charitable organizations. We have chosen to focus on the inter-firm 
effects of contributions rather than to model the intertemporal aspects of 
corporate goodwill. We note, however, that if contributions are represented by 
c, and the stock of goodwill, S, depreciates at the rate of d, then goodwill 
depreciates over time according to some function S=c+ds[t-1]+ .... For more 
on goodwill and depreciation, see Webb (1992). 
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or helpful, in the output market.8 Of course, some examples are not 
clearly harmful or helpful. Mobil Oil's support of public television, 
while benefiting Mobil, may benefit the reputation of all firms in the 
oil industry to some degree, or may have no effect on other firms. 
Both harmful and helpful gifts may be made to affect the factor 
market. A harmful gift is made to lower the firm's input costs relative 
to the costs faced by rival firms. When a company donates a large 
amount to a business school, it expects to lure graduates away from its 
competitors in the labour market by having a 'presence' on the campus. 
In contrast, a helpful gift lowers the cost of attracting labour to the 
industry or to the local area, at the expense of some other industry 's 
or local area's cost of hiring labour. If pharmaceutical companies 
contribute to chemical engineering departments of universities and 
colleges, the pharmaceutical industry may lure graduates away from 
the oil industry, the major competitor for this type oflabour. 
3 Themodel 
A static game theory duopoly model with two symmetric firms is 
used to illustrate the problem of profit maximization where the choice 
variables are goodwill (charitable) expenditures and output. The model 
may be generalized to include n firms. In the model, quantity and 
demand are assumed to be linearly related; because of the likelihood 
of diminishing returns in goodwill spending, linearity is not imposed 
on goodwill. 
The firm's inverse demand function is a function of quantity and 
the effects of both firms' goodwill spending. A negative relationship 
between price and quantity holds, and a positive relationship between 
the firm's own goodwill spending and price is assumed. In addition, w D 
is used to measure the effect of the other firm's contributions on price. 
This effect may be positive (helpful) or negative (harmful): a firm's 
contribution which increases its own demand may also increase 
demand for both firms' production, or it may decrease demand for the 
other firm's products. 
8 This could be viewed as a positive externality as well as a cooperative 
action. Since the use of the term 'cooperative' may be the situation where 
players negotiate before the game, cooperative applies to charitable giving in 
the sense that many corporate giving officers consult one another and plan 
gifts as a result of information about other firms' contributions. 
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Goodwill enters the cost function via the effect of expenditures 
made that lower the cost of factor inputs. Costs are a function of the 
firm's own production and goodwill spending chosen in each period. 
The effect of the other firm's contributions on costs is captured by w 0 
The total spending on charitable contributions by firm 1 is:9 
(1) 
where Gw are contributions that raise demand and Gie lower costs. 
Firm 1 's inverse demand and average cost functions are10 (wherej 
refers to the other firm): 
Gl/2 1/2 Pi = u - Qi - Qj + iD + W nGjD 
_ 0 1;2 0 1;2 Ci - v + Qi - ;e - we je 
Where Pi =the price firm 1 may charge 
u,v =the demand and cost intercepts 
Qi =the quantity produced by firm 1 
(2) 
(3) 
w n =the effect of goodwill expenditures made by firm 2 that 
affect the price firm 1 receives (this could be positive if 
firm 2 's expenditures are helpful, or negative if they are 
not) 
we =the effect of goodwill expenditures made by firm 2 that 
affect the costs of firm 1 (similarly, positive or negative). 
Note that -1::;; we, wn::;; 1, that is, the effects of goodwill expenditures 
may range from completely harmful (or predatory) ( -1) to completely 
helpful (or cooperative) (+1). Thus, wnG~~ represents the total effect 
on firm 1 (positive or negative) of firm 2 's contributions affecting the 
output market. 
Combining, the profit function for firm 1 is: 
(4) 
The profit function may be analysed under three usual game-
theoretic cases (mathematical derivations are available from the 
authors). In the first case, firms are noncooperative and compete in 
9 In practice, separating contributions that raise demand from those that 
lower costs would be extremely difficult. Many contributions probably affect 
both demand and cost, at least to some degree. 
10 Our general results are robust to this specification, except in case 3, which 
is discussed. 
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both output and goodwill.11 Each firm must take into account its rival's 
behaviour; thus each firm forecasts the other firm's output and 
goodwill choices in order to make sensible decisions about its own 
choices. Each firm chooses its profit-maximizing level of output and 
goodwill expenditures in both the factor and output markets: 
ni(ncoop) = (u - v)
2
( 6) 
2 (8- wn - we) (5) 
First-order conditions and comparative statics show standard 
results: if firm 2 makes a cooperative contribution (one which 
increases industry demand or lowers industry costs, i.e. w > 0), the 
quantity firm 1 sells rises, and the price firm 1 may charge rises, 
increasing profits for firm 1. By symmetry, the same holds true for firm 
2. Additionally, if firm 1 's expenditures are competitive with firm 2 's, 
the price and quantity responses are negative, and lower profits result 
for both firms. 
Second, consider the situation where firms (implicitly or explicitly) 
agree to cooperate in their expenditures on goodwill, but still compete 
with respect to their output level. Firms choose goodwill expenditures 
to maximize joint profits given and q1 and q2. To find the equilibrium, 
assume that firm 1 maximizes profits given the goodwill choices of 
both firms, and sets q1 accordingly. Firm 2 maximizes profits similarly. 
The equation: 
(6) 
results in the optimal choices of goodwill in the factor and output 
markets for each firm. Solving for the cooperative solution results in: 
n~(coop) = 112 [(u - v) + G~~(l + Wn) + G~~(l + Wn)] 2 - G1c - Gin 
(7) 
Comparison of equations (5) and (7) show that ni (coop) > ni ( ncoop). 
The comparative static results are the same as in the noncooperative 
solution. If the firms' expenditures are cooperative, goodwill raises 
quantity and price, increasing profits for both firms. If they are not, 
the quantity sold and price that either firm may charge is lower, 
decreasing profits. 
11 Noncooperative refers to the structure of the industry-a firm may choose 
to compete in goodwill if it is to its advantage to do so. 
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Because cooperation in goodwill spending has a positive effect on 
both firms' profits, cooperation leads to higher levels of goodwill 
spending and higher profits than in the noncooperative case. 
Similarly, making charitable expenditures that have negative effects 
on both firms' profits leads to lower levels of goodwill spending than 
in the noncooperative case. This is as expected, and efficiency is 
gained through cooperation.12 
Suppose firms are cooperating in charitable spending. A natural 
question to ask is, why should a firm continue to cooperate? 
Alternatively one could ask, will cooperation last? Although it is 
unlikely that firms make explicit agreements to cooperate with each 
other in charitable spending, they may tacitly agree to a cooperative 
strategy that results in an equilibrium level of cooperative 
contributions. On the other hand, if contributions are used to 
differentiate the firm from its competitors, the 'cooperative strategy' 
results in an equilibrium level of 'harmful' contributions. The third 
case considers the conditions that might cause a firm to deviate from 
the cooperative strategy. 
Suppose that firm 1 deviates from the cooperative equilibrium by 
lowering its goodwill spending. It adversely affects profits in the 
industry, but it may still enjoy higher profits by receiving the benefit of 
firm 2 's contributions. Firm 1 maximizes profits according to equation 
(4) and chooses q1, Gw, Gic, treating values for q2, G2n, G2c as in the 
cooperative solution. It can be shown that: 
n;'(dev) >ni(coop) > ni (ncoop) (8) 
The level of cooperation in goodwill spending, w, enters each of the 
profit equations. As w rises (falls), profits rise (fall) in each case, but the 
rate of change of profits is not obvious and depends on the functional 
form we have chosen. The level of w affects profits and the incentives for 
firms to cooperate in goodwill spending, but the exact conditions for 
sustaining cooperation are not known with certainty. In this 
functional form, as w goes up, cooperation is less likely. 
12 Note output changes with the level of goodwill, and is different in the 
cooperative and noncooperative cases. The level of goodwill spending 
ultimately chosen may be different from the expected solution. In this 
example, a cooperative choice of goodwill spending expands demand for both 
firms. The result gives increased incentive to expand output, which may harm 
the firm's prices. The consequences of these changes on profits determine 
whether or not it is in each firm's interest to cooperate in goodwill spending. 
This scenario is not examined in this paper. 
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More interestingly, firms have different time horizons and discount 
rates which affect their strategic decisions. Because firms make choices 
simultaneously, each firm chooses its action before observing that of 
the other firm. Each has no possibility of reacting in the current 
period. Suppose that firms monitor each other's activities, and, 
employing a simple trigger strategy, are prepared to revert to a 
noncooperative strategy in the next period if deviation occurs.13 Both 
firms' reaction functions are constructed from the noncooperative 
solution. As theory predicts, firm 1 would find it in its interest to lower 
charitable spending only if the loss resulting from returning to the 
noncooperative strategy in the future is· lower than the one-period 
gain resulting from deviating in the current period.14 Thus, firm 1 will 
continue to cooperate if: 
T T 
[no(dev) +I: P 1n(ncoop)] <LP 1n(coop) (9) 
t=l t=O 
where pis the discount factor (P = 1/(l + r), where r is the discount 
rate), and t represents time. This general result, not specific to this 
model, changes as P and T change. The left-hand side represents the 
profits from deviating in the current period plus profits earned in all 
subsequent periods under the noncooperative scenario. The right-hand 
side is long-run profits from cooperating. If p rises, the firm discounts 
future values less, and the profits from both the noncooperative and 
cooperative situations change. Because ni(coop) >ni(ncoop), it is more 
likely that cooperation will be sustained since profits are likely to be 
higher under cooperation. Similarly, as T increases, the number of 
periods that firms revert to the noncooperative situation rises, 
changing the trade-off between profits from deviating and profits from 
cooperating. Again, profits are higher in the cooperative case, which 
makes cooperation more likely to be sustained. 
13 For more on trigger strategies, see Friedman (1971) and Green and Porter 
(1984} 
14 If firms are predatory in their charitable spending, raising goodwill 
spending increases the negative effects of goodwill on industry profits. In the 
current period, firm 1 might raise its goodwill spending and raise its own 
profits, but it can expect that firm 2 will follow suit in the next (and all 
succeeding) periods, lowering industry profits in the long run. Again, firm 1 
would find it in its interest to deviate from the cooperative strategy only if the 
loss resulting from returning to the noncooperative strategy in the future is 
lower than the one-period gain resulting from deviating in the current period. 
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4 Findings and ideas for future research 
This paper establishes a framework for exam1mng charitable 
spending using a static duopoly model, where firms treat goodwill 
expenditures in both the output and factor markets as strategic 
variables. Goodwill expenditures are harmful or helpful (cooperative), 
and efficiency is gained through cooperation (profits from cooperating 
are larger than profits from noncooperation). 
The model suggests specific outcomes which might be observed 
empirically. Two major questions are: (i) which firms give 
cooperatively and which give predatorily, and (ii) which firms have 
incentives to deviate from cooperative giving? First, we discuss what 
types of products, firms, and industries might be likely to engage in 
predatory or cooperative giving. Second, we discuss what conditions 
provide incentives to deviate from cooperative giving. 
4.1 Predatory versus cooperative giving: products, firms, 
and industries 
The model suggests that in industries that gain from cooperative 
contributions, firms are likely to contribute more than noncooperative 
firms, and are likely to have higher profits as a result. Similarly, firms in 
industries that compete with one another are likely to contribute less 
and to have lower profits. Thus, one might expect industries with highly 
substitutable products to be predatory. If the industry behaves as a zero· 
sum game, then it is important to gain market share at the expense of a 
competitor. Coke and Pepsi, various beer brands, and Ford versus 
General Motors are examples that might warrant examination. 
An industry with great brand-name recognition might be expected 
to participate more in predatory giving. Because of name recognition it 
is easier to gain at the expense of your competitor (once again, Coke 
versus Pepsi). If there is no brand-name recognition (milk, for 
example) one would expect predatory giving to be ineffective; 
cooperative giving would more effectively boost the industry. Further, 
if an industry gains (as a whole) from giving, then cooperative giving is 
expected. For example, the cigarette industry might attempt to 'defend' 
itself as an industry; market share of a particular brand may not be as 
important as industry reputation and sales. Similarly, food products 
like chicken and beef compete with other entire industries as much as 
they do within the industry. In these cases, firms within the industry 
may work together to 'beat' the other industry. 
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4.2 Conditions for deviation (predatory giving) 
What conditions provide firms with incentives to deviate from 
cooperative giving? The model contends market conditions determine 
whether cooperation is sustainable. As the time horizon lengthens or 
the discount factor of future earnings rises, firms are more likely to 
cooperate in charitable spending because the short-run rise in profits 
from deviating is outweighed by the long-run profits earned from 
cooperating. 
Firms that deviate from agreements do so because the short-lived 
profit from doing so exceeds the long-term benefits from cooperation. 
Short time horizons or huge one-time profits from cheating on an 
(explicit or implicit) agreement would cause deviation to occur. The 
short time horizon may exist in firms with older managers, or firms 
that produce a 'faddish' product such as, perhaps, a diet drink or a 
child's game, or some types of clothing. Producers of products made 
with rapidly changing and quickly outdated technologies may also 
have short time horizons. 
A longer time horizon might be found in corporations where 
products have existed longer. Thus, history could be a predictor of the 
future. 'Stable' corporations (blue chip stocks, for example), and those 
with patents (such as pharmaceuticals) should have a long-time 
horizon. Finally, firms with young managers (across industries) may 
have a longer time horizon. In all these cases, the model suggests a 
higher degree of cooperative giving relative to firms with shorter time 
horizons. 
Lastly, firms that are tied to a community by large physical capital 
investments (such as a car plant) or by locational constraints (such as a 
utility or cable company) would be expected to engage in corporate 
giving in general. Owing to their long time horizon, we might expect 
to see a higher degree of cooperative giving. 
4.3 Suggestions for empirical testing 
Although little data exist to test these theoretical conclusions, 
firm-level data on corporate contributions are starting to become more 
available and reliable.15 These data may lead to testable hypotheses 
about the use of corporate contributions as strategic variables in 
15 Even though some data for total corporate giving, by firm, exist, their 
unreliablity make drawing conclusions about motivations and effects of 
corporate giving questionable. 
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firms' decision sets. Webb's (1992, pp.189-94) analysis of 831 large, 
publicly traded corporations reporting contributions (Compustat 
1970--89) attempted to show a relationship between corporate 
foundations and long-term measures of firm profitability, tax rates, 
and size and industry characteristics. Firms with corporate 
foundations tend to observe each other's charitable activities. These 
firms tended to have higher profits than firms without foundations. 
Whether this can be construed as some sort of cooperation in 
corporate giving is unclear from current empirical work. However, 
continued analysis of the giving patterns of corporations may lead to 
evidence for or against our results. 
Analysis of the relationship between a firm's giving and 
concentration ratios, advertising ratios, and other industrial 
attributes would improve understanding of the relationship between 
strategy, industry type and giving. Specifically, the model's prediction 
that predatory giving would rise with greater degrees of competition 
might be tested by examining market concentration, advertising 
spending, measures of importance of brand name, and substitutability 
(or other proxies for competition) against the amount and types of gifts 
made by firms in various industries. For example, how does giving by 
Coca-Cola and Pepsi Co. differ from giving by firms producing a good 
with little brand-name recognition or giving by firms whose products 
are not easily substitutable? 
Similarly, how does giving change in an industry where 
cooperation might result in industry gains? (And, more importantly, 
how can these industries and gains be identified?) Would donations by 
the 'Got Milk' campaign (formerly the California Dairy Association, 
now being used across the USA) have a different effect on the dairy 
industry than, say, donations by cigarette manufacturers on the 
tobacco industry? Identifying industries that give cooperatively is the 
first step in testing the model's hypothesis about cooperative giving; 
the second is identifying gains from corporate giving in conjunction 
with advertising efforts. 
Analysis of the nature of gifts might provide insight into the effect 
of corporate goodwill on both the factor and output markets. One of the 
ways to examine goodwill in the factor market is to examine the reasons 
for and extent of corporate participation in employee-matching grants 
programmes. (Aetna, for example, has a very liberal programme, 
allowing employees to donate time and money to their choices of 
charities, which is matched with support from Aetna.) In addition, if 
corporations give largely to 'public' concerns (city parks and 
improvements, individual local arts grants, etc.) it may be that these 
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contributions are used to lower the firm's wage bill, entice workers to 
move to the area or remain in the same job because the employer is a 
'good corporate citizen: 
Goodwill in the output market may be further explored by raising 
the following issues. When is contributing a substitute for advertising? 
How are sponsorships of sporting events different from advertising 
expenditures made for the same purposes? Does charitable 
sponsorship raise consumer awareness about certain products or 
companies? Are 'high-profile' contributions made by certain companies 
in certain situations; for example, did Exxon increase contributions 
after the oil spill? Do some contributions increase the firm's market 
share at the expense of some other company's share? An example that 
may support this idea is the 1991 US Sprint commercial on television, in 
which US Sprint offers new customers the chance to donate 5 per cent of 
their first telephone bill to the environmental charity of the customer's 
choice. Candice Bergen delivers the punchline in this advertisement: 
'Are we doing this to get your business? Who cares, we' re doing it!' 
The idea that firms have different time horizons and discount rates 
which affect their strategic decisions may also be testable given new 
and better data. A different 'valuation' of time may be reflected in two 
ways. First, we might expect firms that intend to exist for many years 
to view corporate giving as an investment. The idea that Japanese 
firms contribute to US charities may suggest their intention to be in 
business for a long time. Firms producing a fad item or those whose 
products are becoming outdated may not be interested in 
philanthropy. Another time issue might be that the views of chief 
executives or other management figures on donations depend on their 
own discount rates and time horizons. These issues might be reflected in 
some of the data collected by the Foundation Center, or other agencies 
that send questionnaires to corporate givers. 
Testable hypotheses are that firms with long product life-cycles, 
patents, younger management, and non-rapidly changing technologies 
should cooperate more in giving than do firms producing 'faddish' or 
technologically 'dated' products, or those with older management. 
Finally, firms with very large physical capital investments, or those 
constrained geographically (utilities, cable companies, and those 
depending on natural resources specific to a certain area) might 
participate to a greater extent in cooperative giving. Galaskiewicz 
(1991) provides an interesting analysis of corporate giving in the 
Minneapolis-St Paul area, where 5 per cent of net income is regularly 
expected of corporate donors. 
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In sum, with data on firm, products and industries, and specifically 
on substitutability among products, product life-cycle lengths, brand 
name recognition, competition (inter- or intra-industry), and manager 
ages, one could test whether predictions made by the model in this 
paper hold. The idea that corporate contributions have interfirm 
effects, and are strategic variables in a firm's decision-making 
process, suggest many avenues for future research into this little 
understood phenomena. 
Appendix A 
Case 1. A noncooperative duopoly 
In a noncooperative situation, firms compete in both output and 
goodwill.16 Each firm must take into account its rival's behaviour; 
thus each firm has to forecast the other firm's output and goodwill 
choices in order to make sensible decisions about its own choices. 
Each firm then chooses a profit-maximizing level of output and 
goodwill expenditures in both the factor and output markets: 
ni(ncoop) = (u - v)2(6) 2 
(8 - wv - we) (10) 
Solving the three first-order conditions and assuming symmetric firms 
. * * d G* G* G* G* 17 Th t" t t" gives: q1 = q2 , an lD = 1c = 2v = 2c. e compara 1ve s a 1c 
results are: 
c5n c5n 
-- -->0 ifwv,wc>O 
c5wv' c5wc 
c5n c5n 




16 Noncooperative refers to the structure of the industry-a firm may choose 
to compete in goodwill if it is to its advantage to do so. 
17 Derivations and mathematical computations are available from the 
authors upon request. 
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Similarly, 




From equations (11) and (13), if firm 2 makes a cooperative 
contribution (one which increases industry demand or lowers industry 
costs, i.e. w > 0), the quantity firm 1 sells rises, and the price firm 1 may 
charge rises, increasing profits for firm 1. By symmetry, the same holds 
true for firm 2. Equations (12) and (14) show if firm 1 's expenditures are 
competitive with firm 2 's, the price and quantity responses are negative 
and lower profits result for both firms. 
Case 2. Cooperation in goodwill spending; competition in output 
Consider the situation where firms (implicitly or explicitly) agree 
to cooperate in their expenditures on goodwill, but still compete with 
respect to their output level. The firms choose goodwill expenditures, 
GiD and G;c, to maximize joint profits given q1 and q2. To find the 
equilibrium, assume that firm 1 maximizes profits given the goodwill 
choices of both firms, and sets q1 accordingly. Firm 2 maximizes 
profits similarly. The equation: 
(15) 
results in the following: 
G~c = ( Q1 + ;cQ2) 2 
Firm 1 chooses q to maximize profits, assuming that goodwill 
expenditures have already been chosen. This results in: 
- 1 [ 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 l Q1 - 4 u - v + G1n + wnGw + Gic + WcG2c - q2 (16) 
Setting q1 = q2 and substituting in for goodwill results in the 
cooperative solution: 
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'· 
*( ) _ (u - v) 2 (6 - 2wn - Wb - 2wc - w~) 
n; coop - 2 2 2 (8 - 2wn - Wn - 2wc - we) (17) 
Comparison of equations (10) and (17) show that ni (coop) > ni ( ncoop). 
The comparative statics results are the same as in the noncooperative 
solution (equations (11)-(14)). If the firms' expenditures are cooperative, 
goodwill raises quantity and price, increasing profits for both firms. If 
they are not, the quantity sold and price that either firm may charge is 
lower, decreasing firm profits. 
Because cooperation in goodwill spending has a positive effect on 
both firms' profits, cooperation leads to higher levels of goodwill 
spending and higher profits than in the noncooperative case. 
Similarly, making charitable expenditures that have negative effects 
on both firms' profits leads to lower levels of goodwill spending than 
in the noncooperative case. This is as expected, and efficiency is 
gained through cooperation.18 
Case 3. Incentives to deviate 
Suppose firms are cooperating in charitable spending. A natural 
question to ask is, why should a firm continue to cooperate? 
Alternatively one could ask, is cooperation sustainable? Although it is 
unlikely that firms make explicit agreements to cooperate with each 
other in charitable spending, they may tacitly agree to a cooperative 
strategy that results in an equilibrium level of cooperative 
contributions. On the other hand, if contributions are used to 
differentiate the firm from its competitors, the 'cooperative strategy' 
results in an equilibrium level of 'harmful' contributions. This section 
considers the conditions that might cause a firm to deviate from the 
cooperative strategy. 
Suppose that firm 1 deviates from the cooperative equilibrium by 
lowering its goodwill spending. It adversely affects profits in the 
industry, but it may still enjoy higher profits by receiving the benefit of 
18 Note output changes with the level of goodwill, and is different in the 
cooperative and noncooperative cases. The level of goodwill spending 
ultimately chosen may be different from the expected solution. In this 
example, a cooperative choice of goodwill spending expands demand for both 
firms. This result gives increased incentive to expand output, which may harm 
the firms' prices. The consequences of these changes on profits determine 
whether or not it is in each firm's interest to cooperate in goodwill spending. 
This scenario is not examined in this paper. 
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firm 2 's contributions. Firm 1 maximizes profits according to equation 
(4) and chooses qi, Gw, GIG, treating values for Q2, Gw, G2c as in the 
cooperative solution. The profit function for firm 1, is: 
*(d ) _ (u - v) 2 (18 - 6wn - 6wc + w'b/2 + w~/2 + 2wnwc) ( ) 
7t1 ev - 2 2 2 18 
3(8 - 2wn - wD - 2wc - we) 
It can be shown that: 
n~ ( dev) > ni (coop) > ni ( ncoop) (19) 
The level of cooperation in goodwill spending, w, enters each of the 
profit equations. When w is equal to zero, all profits are equal; there are 
no interfirm effects of contributions on profits. As w rises (falls), profits 
rise (fall) in each case, but the rate of change of profits is not obvious 
and depends on the functional form we have chosen. The level of w 
affects profits and the incentives for firms to cooperate in goodwill 
spending, but the exact conditions for sustaining cooperation are not 
known with certainty. In this functional form, as w goes up, 
cooperation is less likely. 
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Bienfaisance d'entreprise: Une approche basee sur la theorie des 
jeux pour analyser l'effet des depenses caritatives des entreprises 
sur leur comportement 
Les contributions caritatives des entreprises, a l'instar des depenses 
publicitaires, peuvent avoir une incidence a long terme sur l'image de 
l'entreprise et son profit. Des exemples recents de dons d'entreprise 
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temoignent que nombre d'entre eux sont fails dans le cadre de l'interet bien 
pense du donateur. Une fa{:on de considerer le don d'entreprise est de le 
trailer comme un instrument de gestion qui a un effet sur les profits de 
l'entreprise. Cet article examine les depenses caritatives en considerant que 
les entreprises traitent ces dernieres comme des variables strategiques tant 
sur le marche des produits que sur celui des facteurs. Ces contributions de 
bienfaisance peuvent etre accrues ou diminuees par celles des autres 
entreprises. Le modele permet aussi aux entreprises de prendre en matiere 
de dons des decisions de nature cooperative ou non cooperative, la 
cooperation engendrant un gain d'efficacite. Les conditions du marche 
determinent si la cooperation est durable. Plus ['horizon temporel est 
eloigne, plus [e taux dactua[isation des gains f uturs est e[eve OU plus le 
niveau de cooperation industrielle dans le secteur est important, plus les 
entreprises sont susceptibles de cooperer en matiere de donations 
caritatives. 
Corporate Goodwill: ein spieltheoretischer Ansatz fur die 
Wirkung wohltatiger Unternehmensausgaben auf das 
Unternehmensverhalten 
Unternehmensbeitrage fur wohltatige Zwecke konnen, wie Werbeausgaben, 
eine langfristige Wirkung auf das Image und die Gewinne eines 
Unternehmens haben. Neuere Beispiele von Unternehmensspendentatig-
keit zeigen, da/3 viele Geschenke aus "wohlverstandenem Eigeninteresse" des 
Gebers gemacht werden. Eine Moglichkeit, Unternehmensspendentatigkeit 
zu betrachten, besteht darin, sie als ein Management-Instrument 
anzusehen, das die Unternehmensgewinne beeinfluf3t. Dieser Beitrag 
untersucht die Spendentatigkeit fur wohltatige Zwecke unter der 
Annahme, da/3 Unternehmen "goodwill"-Ausgaben sowohl auf den 
Produkt- als auch auf den Faktormarkten als strategische Variablen 
behandeln. Spendenzahlungen kOnnen durch Spendenzahlungen, die 
andere Unternehmen Leisten, erhoht oder gesenkt werden. Das Modell 
erlaubt den Unternehmen, Entscheidungen uber die Unternehmens-
spendentatigkeit zu treffen, die kooperativ sind oder unkooperativ, Effizienz 
durch Kooperation erzielt wird. Die Marktbedingungen bestimmen, ob 
Kooperation aufrechterhaltbar ist. Mit der Verlangerung des Zeithorizonts 
steigt der Diskontierungsfaktor zukunftiger Gewinne, oder das Niveau der 
Kooperation in der Wirtschaft steigt, und es wird wahrscheinlicher, da/3 
Unternehmen bei der Spendentatigkeit zugunsten wohltatiger Zwecke 
kooperieren. 
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Beneficencia de empresa: Una aproximacion basada en la teoria 
de juegos para analizar el efecto de los gastos caritativos de las 
empresas sobre su comportamiento 
Las contribuciones caritativas de las empresas a semejanza de los gastos 
publicitarios, pueden tener una incidencia a largo plazo sobre la imagen de 
la empresa y sobre su beneficio. Ejemplos recientes de donativos de empresas, 
atestiguan que muchos de ellos se efectuan en el marco del interes propio del 
donante. Una manera de considerar el donativo de empresa es tratorio como 
un instrumento de gesti6n que tiene efectos sobre los beneficios de la 
empresa. Este articulo examina los gastos caritativos bajo la consideraci6n 
de que las empresas los tratan como variables estrategicas tanto en el 
mercado de productos como en el de factores. Estas contribuciones de 
beneficiencia pueden ser incrementadas o disminuidas por las de otras 
empresas. El modelo tambien permite a las empresas tomar en materia de 
donativos decisiones de naturaleza cooperativa o no cooperativa. La 
cooperaci6n comporta un plus de eficacia. Las condiciones del mercado 
determinan si la cooperaci6n es o no duradera. Cuanto mas alejado este el 
horizonte temporal, cuanto mas elevada sea la tasa de actualizaci6n de los 
beneficios f uturos o mayor sea el nivel de cooperaci6n industrial en el sector, 
las empresas seran mas proclives a cooperar en materia de donativos 
caritativos. 
©CIRIEC 1996 
